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Defendant-Appellant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

)
)

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _)

NO.

1

CANYON COUNTY NO.

2011-16748

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
IN SUPPORT OF
PETITION FOR REVIEW

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Juan Ramon Berber asks the Idaho Supreme Court to review the opinion of the
Idaho Court of Appeals, 2014 Unpublished Opinion No. 457 (Ct. App. April 17, 2014)

(hereinafter, Opinion).

He submits that the Opinion, which affirmed his judgment of

conviction, is in conflict with this Court's opinions in State v. Joy, 155 Idaho 1 (2013),
and State v. Grist, 14 7 Idaho 49 (2009). 1

1

Mr. Berber continues to maintain that the district court erred when it failed to conduct a
proper 403 balancing test before admitting "other bad act" evidence under I.R.E. 404(b),
1

Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
Juan Ramon Berber was charged, by amended indictment, with lewd conduct
alleged to have been committed against then-thirteen year old N.M. by way of genitalto-genital or manual-to-genital contact.

(R., pp.106-07.) According to

State, the

incident was believed to have occurred on December 31, 2008. (Tr., p.51, Ls.12-16.)
Pursuant to I.RE. 404(b), the State sought to present "other bad act" evidence
consisting entirely of conduct that occurred after the incident for which Mr. Berber was
charged. In describing the Rule 404(b) evidence, the State explained, "there's all these
other instances where she [N.M.] talks about, you know, it continued to
we intend to introduce those." (Tr., p.51, Ls.1

. And so

) That conduct

genital contact, genital-to-anal contact, oral-to-genital contact,

manual-to-genital

contact" that purportedly occurred both in Idaho and California, all after the incident for
which Mr. Berber was being prosecuted. (Tr., p.52, L.15

p.55, L.19.)

Defense counsel objected to the Rule 404(b) evidence, explaining that he didn't
understand how it could be admissible without "a proper showing of how it's admissible
or relevant to the actual charge."

(Tr., p.214, Ls.1-21.)

Ultimately, the district court

ruled that the Rule 404(b) evidence was admissible because of "the fact that - that
there are other

issues other than propensity that could - that relate to this, I'm going

to permit it." (Tr., p.225, L.24 - p.226, L.4.) In discussing the balancing test that is
required under Rule 403, the district court explained that it need not conduct such a test
in this case "because it's - it's the same individuals." (Tr., p.226, Ls.5-13.)

but will rely on the arguments set forth in his Appellant's Brief for that claim. He
respectfully requests that if this Court grants his Petition for Review, it consider all
claims raised in his Appellant's Brief, which is incorporated herein by reference.
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Throughout the trial, the
was

prosecuted was

made it

that

incident for which Mr. Berber

the first incident of alleged conduct, which it bel

occurred on December 31, 2008. (Tr., p.51, Ls.12-17, p.53, Ls.5-1

p.244, Ls.1

("But there is going to be one consistent thing that she's always talked about, and that's
the defendant put his penis inside her vagina, that it hurt, that aftervvards when she went
to the bathroom, it hurt again."), Tr., p.609, Ls.9-19.)

This can best be seen when

examining the following portion of the State's rebuttal closing argument:
[Y]ou don't have to find that it happened on a specific date. But I submit to
you that memory of New Year's, the party she talked about, falling asleep
on the couch, that there were other people there, that that's consistent
with
Year's. People have people over.
is a party.
stay
up
People drink.
You do have to agree on the act. And you have an option. You have
not
either manual-to-genital contact[2] or genital-to-genital contact. It
have to be both. You've heard that there was genital-to-genital contact.
And I submit to you that that's the count, the portion of this that you find
the defendant guilty of. That he put his penis inside her vagina on or
about New Year's Eve after he'd gained her trust. Moved in with her and
had her completely away from her father.
(Tr., p.620, L.20 - p.621, L.10 (emphasis added).)
Following a jury trial at which other bad act testimony concerning a wide range of
alleged sexual misconduct, including oral, anal, and vaginal sex occurring in at least two

The record is devoid of any testimony by N.M. that there was any manual-to-genital
contact. (Tr., p.325, L.25 - p.327, L.11 (describing the New Year's Eve genital-togenital contact for which Mr. Berber was charged), p.330, Ls.2-20 (testifying that
genital-to-genital contact continued to occur bi-weekly), p.330, L.21 - p.338, L.9
(describing oral-to-genital contact on one occasion while driving from Idaho to
California), p.338, L.10 - p.340, L.5 (bi-weekly genital-to-genital contact while in
California), p.340, L.6 - p.344, L.1 (one incident of genital-to-anal contact), p.344, L.1 0
- p.346, L.25 (describing another incident of oral-to-genital contact in Idaho), p.375,
Ls.17-18 (denying any contact between Mr. Berber's penis and N.M.'s hand), p.378,
Ls.4-6 (same), p.383, Ls.18-19 (same), p.394, Ls.14-23 (describing the two incidents of
oral-to-genital contact).)
2
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a
the incident

to have

Mr.

was found guilty of lewd conduct for

on December 31, 2008. (Tr., p.637, Ls.5-14.)

Mr. Berber filed a timely Notice of Appeal. (R., p.21

)

In concluding that the district court's decision to admit subsequent bad act
evidence over Mr. Berber's objection was appropriate, the Idaho Court of Appeals
reasoned that it was relevant because "the charged and uncharged conduct was linked
as part of a course of conduct.

Thus, the California conduct was relevant to

demonstrate that Berber engaged in a common scheme or plan to sexually abuse N.M.
from December 31, 2008, in Idaho to November 2009 in California."
omitted).)
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(Opinion at 5

ISSUE
Is the Court of
Opinion affirming
rt's opinions in Joy and

5

Berber's conviction in conflict with this

ARGUMENT
The Court Of Appeals' Opinion Affirming Mr. Berber's Conviction Conflicts With This
Court's Opinions In Jov And Grist

A.

Introduction
In rejecting Mr. Berber's argument that the district court erred by admitting

irrelevant propensity evidence at his trial, the Court of Appeals engaged in an analysis
that conflicts with this Court's opinions in State v. Joy, 155 Idaho 1 (2013), and State v.
Grist, 147 Idaho 49 (2009). As such, he respectfully requests that this Court grant his

Petition for Review, and apply the reasoning underlying

B.

Court's opinions in Joy and

The Court Of Appeals' Opinion Affirming Mr. Berber's Conviction Conflicts With
This Court's Opinions In Joy And Grist
In concluding that evidence of subsequent bad acts was properly admitted, the

Court of Appeals, after acknowledging Grist and Joy, reasoned,
[E]vidence of the California conduct had a non-propensity purpose as it
was relevant to demonstrate a common scheme or plan. Moreover,
N.M.'s testimony of the California conduct allowed the jury to see the full
picture and put N.M.'s testimony about the charged acts [sic] into context.
Having knowledge of the full extent of the sexual abuse allowed the jury to
determine if N.M.'s inconsistencies were a result of trauma from the abuse
or a result of untruthfulness. Testimony that N.M. continued to live under
Berber's control after she left Idaho and continued to be sexually abused
by him was relevant for the jury to determine N.M.'s credibility. By
allowing testimony of the events that transpired between the Idaho
conduct and the report of the abuse, the jury was able to assess whether
N.M. was fabricating her story or telling the truth. Accordingly, evidence of
the California conduct was relevant for credibility purposes.
(Opinion at 6.)
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In reaching

conclusion that

bad

was

for

moses of enhancing N.M.'s credibility, the Court of Appeals relied heavily on the
following passage from State v. Scovell, 136 Idaho 587 (Ct. App.

1),

The Idaho Supreme Court has held that in prosecutions for sexual
molestation of a child, evidence of uncharged incidents of the defendant's
sexual misconduct with the same victim or with other children is relevant
to demonstrate the young victim's credibility. State v. Tolman, 121 Idaho
899, 904, 828 P.2d 1304, 1309 (1992); [State v. Moore, 120 Idaho 743,
745-46, 819 P.2d 1143, 1145-46 (1991)].
Scovell, 136 Idaho at 590, 38 P.3d at 628. In Grist, the Idaho Supreme
Court narrowed the admission of other bad acts for credibility purposes by
stating that such evidence is inadmissible when its "probative value is
entirely dependent upon its tendency to demonstrate the defendant's
propensity to
in such be!1avior." Grist, 147 Idaho
205
1190.
(Opinion at 5-6 (brackets in original).)

The key problem with the Court of Appeals'

analysis is that it relied on one of its own cases that in turn rested on two of this Court's
cases - Moore and Tolman - the reasoning of which has been effectively disavowed by
this Court. 3 Given the fact that the "theoretical underpinnings" of the quoted passage
from Scovell were taken from the now-disavowed reasoning in Moore and Tolman, the
Court of Appeals has impermissibly narrowed this Court's clear holding in Grist.
Furthermore, the Court of Appeals completely ignored the first part of the paragraph

Although, in Grist, this Court "decline[d] to overrule Moore and Tolman in their
entirety," it did "revisit a theoretical underpinning for the introduction of uncharged
misconduct in cases involving the sexual abuse and exploitation of children" and
"clarif[ied] that the admission of I.RE. 404(b) evidence in a child sex case is subject to
the same analysis as the admission of such evidence in any other case." Grist, 147
Idaho at 51. This Court went on to explain, "Any decision from this Court or the Court of
Appeals that suggests that evidence offered in a case involving an allegation of sexual
misconduct with a child should be treated differently than any other type of case is no
longer controlling authority in Idaho's courts." Id.
3
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from which it quoted - the portion containing this Cou
bad

caution as to the use of

establish an alleged victim's credibility, specifically,
Although we can envision instances in which evidence of uncharged
misconduct will tend to reinforce the credibility of a witness without
reliance on the impermissible theory of the defendant's propensity to
engage in such misconduct, we will not attempt to identify all
circumstances in which such evidence properly may be admitted. Rather,
we will identify the instance in which such evidence may not be admitted:
Evidence of uncharged misconduct may not be admitted pursuant to I.R.
404(b) when its probative value is entirely dependent upon its tendency to
demonstrate the defendant's propensity to engage in such behavior.

Grist, 147 Idaho at 54 (emphasis added).

This Court went on to disavow the very type of logic relied upon by the Court
Appeals in this

specifically in relation to its

in Moore, which relied

the following passage from a law review article, "[A]dmission of corroborative evidence
serves the dual purpose of reducing the probability that the prosecuting witness is lying,
while at the same time increasing the probability that the defendant committed the
crime." Id. (brackets in original) (citations omitted). In rejecting this line of thought, this
Court explained, "[T]he theoretical underpinning of the admissibility of uncharged
misconduct for purposes of 'corroboration' as articulated in Moore is indistinguishable
from admitting such evidence based upon the accused's propensity to engage in such
behavior based upon his or her past behavior." Id. This Court further explained, 'The
unstated premise of Moore is simply this: 'If he did it before, he probably did it this time
as well."' Id. The Court of Appeals' Opinion conflicts with this Court's holding in Grist.
The Court of Appeals' conclusion that the subsequent bad acts evidence was
also relevant and admissible for the non-propensity purpose of demonstrating a
common scheme or plan is also in conflict with this Court's Opinion in Joy.

8

In Joy, this Court considered the trial court's decision to admit
of sexual and physical violence alleged to have

of other bad

committed by the

his wife in a trial for an incident of abuse that purportedly occurred
months later. In discussing the corroboration by common scheme or plan exception, 4
this Court explained,
[TJo be admissible under Rule 404(b ), evidence of prior misconduct must
show more than a superficial similarity to the nature and details of the
charged conduct, but must instead show that the defendant's charged and
uncharged conduct is linked in a way that permits the inference that the
prior conduct was planned as part of a course of conduct leading up to the
charged offense.
155 Idaho at

P.3d at 285 (emphasis added).

In light of the holding in Joy, Mr. Berber's Appellant's Brief argues, "In light of the
fact that the other bad act evidence in Mr. Berber's trial occurred after the conduct for
which he is charged, it is impossible for the subsequent bad acts to have been part of a
common scheme or plan to commit the charged act." (Appellant's Brief, p.8 (emphasis
in original).)
Because the Court of Appeals' Opinion in this case is in conflict with this Court's
opinions in Joy and Grist, this Court should grant Mr. Berber's Petition for Review,
vacate the judgment of conviction, and remand this matter for a new trial.

This Court has explained that the exceptions for preparation, plan, knowledge, and
identity "are most frequently grouped together under the rubric of 'common scheme or
plan."' Grist, 147 Idaho at 54.

4
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CONCLUSION
the reasons

forth herein, Mr. Berber respectfully requests that this Court

grant his Petition for Review, vacate the judgment of conviction, and remand this matter
for a new trial.
DATED this 16th day of June, 2014.

SPES,~CEt:R J. HAHN
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
~--
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14, I served a true
RTIFY
on this 16 day of June,
copy of the foregoing APPELLANT'S BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR
REVIEW, by causing to be placed a copy thereof in the U.S. Mail, addressed to:
I

JUAN RAMON BERBER
INMATE #46110
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PO BOX 70010
BOISE ID 83707
JUNEAL C KERRICK
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
E-MAILED BRIEF
ROBERT TILLEY
ATTORNEY AT LAW
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KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
CRIMINAL DIVISION
PO BOX 83720
BOISE ID 83720-0010
Hand deliver to Attorney General's mailbox at Supreme Court
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